Obligations of public administration in the constitutional rule of Law State

Abstract

This article aims to investigate to what extent the application of parameters such as otherness and sensitive reason, consistent with the Constitutional Rule of Law State, should influence administrative action. The Constitutional Rule of Law State imposes behavioral and paradigmatic changes on the State; what was previously considered a right of citizens becomes a state obligation. Democracy itself needs to be adjusted so as not to interfere with fundamental rights that represent intangible spheres of citizens. Constitutional guarantees acquire binding force, ceasing to have a role of simply establishing limits. Administrative discretion, previously broad and limited only by strict legality, becomes constitutionally bound; law ceases to be seen as a simple set of rules applicable by subsumption. The premise was that the values ​​enshrined in the Federal Constitution cease to be mere theoretical abstractions without any practical connection and become true obligations for the Public Administration towards citizens. The conclusion was reached that the fundamental norm incorporates another nuance and begins to demand administrative solutions consistent with the principles it embodies. Normative validity becomes insufficient; normative application also requires a judgment of validity. Administrative acts and formal rules need to pass through the sieve of sensitive reasons that permeate postmodernity.