Conceitos vagos (definidamente) não têm extensões imprecisas

Authors

  • Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi UFPI

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2025v32n68ID38056

Keywords:

Vagueness, (Un)Sharp Extensions, Borderline Cases of Vagueness, Knowledge of Vague Propositions, Metavagueness

Abstract

In this essay, we will argue against the thesis that the extensions of vague concepts are unsharp. We will also try to show that the admission of this thesis leads us to epistemological difficulties that are apparently insurmountable for semanticism. Finally, we will make some brief observations about the relationship between semanticism and the phenomenon of metavagueness.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

BLACK, M. Vagueness: an exercise in logical analysis. Philosophy of Science. v. 4, n. 4, p. 427-455, 1937.

CARGILE, J. The sorites paradox. In: KEEFE, R.; SMITH, P. (eds.). Vagueness: a reader. Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 89-98, 1996.

COBREROS, P. Paraconsistent vagueness: a positive argument. Synthese, v. 183, p. 211-227, 2011.

DUMMETT, M. Wang’s paradox. Synthese, v. 30, p. 301-324, 1975.

EDGINGTON, D. Vagueness by degrees. In: KEEFE, R.; SMITH, P. (eds.). Vagueness: a reader. Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 294-317, 1996.

FERREIRA, S. S. Vagueza como arbitrariedade: esboço de uma teoria da vagueza. 2017. 166 f. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2017.

FINE, K. Vagueness, truth, and logic. In: KEEFE, R.; SMITH, P. (eds.). Vagueness: a reader. Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 119-150, 1996.

GRAFF, D. Gap principles, penumbral consequence, and infinitely higher-order vagueness. In: BEALL, J. C. (edit.). Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 195-221, 2003.

GRAFF, D. Shifting sands: an interest-relative theory of vagueness. Philosophical Topics, v. 28, n. 1, p. 45-81, 2000.

HORGAN. T. Robust vagueness and the forced-march sorites paradox. Philosophical Perspectives, v. 8, Logic and Language, p. 159-188, 1994.

HYDE, D. The sorites paradox. In: RONZITTI, G. (ed.). Vagueness: a guide. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer. p. 1-18, 2011.

HYDE, D; COLYVAN, M. Paraconsistent vagueness: why not?. Australasian Journal of Logic (6), p. 107-121, 2008.

KEEFE, R. Theories of vagueness. Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2004.

KEEFE, R.; SMITH, P. (eds.). Vagueness: a reader. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996.

LOWE, E. J. Vagueness and Metaphysics. In: RONZITTI, G. (ed.). Vagueness: a guide. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer. p. 19-53, 2011.

LUDLOW, P. Implicit comparison classes. Linguistics and Philosophy v. 12, p. 519-533, 1989.

MCGEE, V.; MCLAUGHLIN, B. Distinctions without a difference. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, v. XXXIII, supplement, p. 203-251, 1994.

PRIEST, G. A site for sorites. In: BEALL, J. C. (edit.). Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 9-23, 2003.

PRIEST, G. What is so bad about contradictions?. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 95, n. 8, p. 410-426, 1998.

RAFFMAN, D. Vagueness and observationality. In: RONZITTI, G. (ed.). Vagueness: a guide. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer. p. 107-121, 2011.

RAFFMAN, D. Vagueness without paradox. The Philosophical Review, v. 103, n. 1, p. 41-74, 1994.

RONZITTI, G (ed.). Vagueness: a guide. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer, 2011.

RUSSELL, B. Vagueness. The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, v. 1, n. 2, p. 84-92, 1923.

SAINSBURY, R. M. Concepts without boundaries. In: KEEFE, R.; SMITH, P. (eds.). Vagueness: a reader. Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 251-264, 1996.

SANFORD, D. H. Vague numbers. Acta Analytica, v. 17, n. 29, p. 63-73, 2002.

SANFORD, D. H. Infinity and vagueness. The Philosophical Review, v. 84, n. 4, p. 520-535, 1975.

SHAPIRO, S. Vagueness and conversation. In: BEALL, J. C. (edit.). Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 39-72, 2003.

SOAMES, S. Higher-order vagueness for partially defined predicates. In: BEALL, J. C. (edit.). Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 128-150, 2003.

SORENSEN, R. A. Vagueness and contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

SORENSEN, R. A. Blindspots. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

TYE, M. Sorites paradoxes and the semantics of vagueness. In: KEEFE, R.; SMITH, P. (eds.). Vagueness: a reader. Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 281-293, 1996.

UNGER, P. There are no ordinary things. Synthese, v. 41, p. 117-154, 1979.

VALCARENGHI, E. C. Epistemicismo e semanticismo, vaguidade e sorites (aguardando publicação na Revista Filosofia Unisinos), 2024.

VALCARENGHI, E. C. Sorensen sobre a vaguidade e o sorites. Veritas, v. 68, n. 1, p. e44897, 2023.

VALCARENGHI, E. C. Filosofia vs. Ciência: as atividades filosófica e científica em contraste (ou por que o naturalismo filosófico é uma barbárie). São Paulo: Dialética, 2022.

Van ROOIJ, R. Vagueness and linguistics. In: RONZITTI, G. (ed.). Vagueness: a guide. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York: Springer. p. 123-170, 2011.

VARZI, A. C. Cut-offs and their neighbors. In: BEALL, J. C. (edit.). Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 24-38, 2003.

WILLIAMSON, T. Identity and Discrimination, revised ed., Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2013.

WILLIAMSON, T. Vagueness. London and New York: Routledge, 1994 (reimp. em 2001).

WILLIAMSON, T. Inexact knowledge. Mind, new series, v. 101, n. 402, p. 217-242, 1992.

WRIGHT, C. Further reflections on the sorites paradox. In: KEEFE, R.; SMITH, P. (eds.). Vagueness: a reader. Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 204-250, 1996.

WRIGHT, C. The epistemic conception of vagueness. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. XXXIII, supplement, p. 133-159, 1994.

WRIGHT, C. On the coherence of vague predicates. Synthese, v. 30, p. 325-365, 1975.

Downloads

Published

20-08-2025

How to Cite

VALCARENGHI, Emerson Carlos. Conceitos vagos (definidamente) não têm extensões imprecisas. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), [S. l.], v. 32, n. 68, 2025. DOI: 10.21680/1983-2109.2025v32n68ID38056. Disponível em: https://www.periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/38056. Acesso em: 21 dec. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 32 No. 68 (2025): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia

Section

Artigos

License

Copyright (c) 2025 Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.